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Abstract—Exploitation of heap vulnerabilities has been on the
rise, leading to many devastating attacks. Conventional heap
patch generation is a lengthy procedure, requiring intensive
manual efforts. Worse, fresh patches tend to harm system
dependability, hence deterring users from deploying them. We
propose a heap patching system that simultaneously has the
following prominent advantages: (1) generating patches without
manual efforts; (2) installing patches without altering the code (so
called code-less patching); (3) handling various heap vulnerability
types; (4) imposing a very low overhead; and (5) no dependency
on specific heap allocators. As a separate contribution, we
propose targeted calling context encoding, which is a suite of
algorithms for optimizing calling context encoding, an important
technique with applications in many areas. The system properly
combines heavyweight offline attack analysis with lightweight
online defense generation, and provides a new countermeasure
against heap attacks. The evaluation shows that the system is
effective and efficient.
Index Terms—Heap memory safety, automatic patch genera-
tion, dynamic analysis, calling context encoding
I. INTRODUCTION
As many effective measures for protecting call stacks get
deployed (such as canaries [1], reordering local variables [2],
and Safe SEH [3]), heap vulnerabilities gain growing attention
of attackers. Heap vulnerabilities can be exploited by attackers
to launch vicious attacks. The recent Heartbleed [4] and
WannaCry [5] attacks demonstrate the dangers. For instance,
the WannaCry ransomware uses the EternalBlue exploit, which
makes use of a heap buffer overwrite vulnerability to hijack
the control flow of the victim program [5].
There are a variety of heap vulnerability types. The follow-
ing types are among the most commonly exploited types.1 (1)
Buffer overflow: it includes both overwrite and overread. By
overwriting a buffer, the attack can manipulate data adjacent to
that buffer and launch various control-data or non-control-data
attacks, while exploitation of overread can steal sensitive in-
formation in memory, such as address space layout and private
keys. (2) Use after free: it refers to accessing memory after
it has been freed. If the memory space being reused is under
the control of attackers, use-after-free bugs can be exploited
to launch various attacks, such as control flow hijacking. (3)
Uninitialized read: exploitation of such vulnerabilities can
leak sensitive information.
1Double free was frequently exploited; but many popular allocators, such
as the default allocator in glibc [6], have built-in double free detection now.
Many approaches have been proposed to tackle heap vulner-
abilities. Some systems try to discover zero-day heap vulnera-
bilities before software release [7]–[9]. Yet, it is very unlikely
to find all of them. A large body of research focuses on detect-
ing, preventing or mitigating heap attacks (and other memory-
based attacks) [10]–[26]. They usually incur a large overhead
or/and can only handle a specific type of heap vulnerabilities.
For example, MemorySanitizer [22] is a dynamic tool that
detects uninitialized read; however, it incurs 2.5x of slowdown
and 2x of memory overhead. AddressSanitizer [10], which
detects overflows and use after free online, is deemed fast,
but still incurs 73% slowdown and 3.4x memory overhead.
As another example, HeapTherapy [21] proposes an efficient
heap buffer overflow detection and response system; however,
it does not provide methods for detecting and handling unini-
tialized read and use after free.
When examining the spectrum of heap security measures,
we notice that handling heap vulnerabilities through patching
has been much less studied. Patching, however, has been
an indispensable step for handling vulnerabilities in practice.
Over decades, conventional patch generation and deployment
have suffered serious limitations. First, the patch generation
is a lengthy procedure. Even for security sensitive bugs, it
takes those big vendors 153 days on average from vulnerability
report to patch availability [27]. A study finds that only 65% of
vulnerabilities in software running on a typical Windows host
have patches available at vulnerability disclosure [28]. This
provides opportunities for attackers to exploit the unpatched
vulnerabilities on a large scale [29]. For resource-constrained
small software companies, it takes even longer time. Plus,
it is unlikely to generate patches for legacy software, whose
support from the vendor has ended.
Second, given a vulnerability, its fresh patches may have not
been thoroughly tested, and thus tend to introduce stability
issues and even logic errors. Although waiting for mature
patches can reduce the risk, it makes the exploitation window
longer. This has been a dilemma in patch deployment [30].
We propose a heap patching system that does not have
the limitations above. Our insight is that, by changing the
configuration of heap memory allocation, all the aforemen-
tioned heap vulnerabilities can be addressed without altering
the program code and, hence, no new bugs are introduced.
Based on the configuration information, the allocator can
accordingly enhance its handling (i.e., allocation, initialization
and deallocation) of buffers that are vulnerable to attacks,
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called vulnerable buffers, and apply security enhancement only
to them (rather than all heap buffers) to minimize the overhead.
We thus propose to generate Heap Patches as Configuration
and call our system HPAC.
HPAC consists of a heavyweight offline patch generation
phase and a lightweight online defense generation phase. In
the offline patch generation phase, we use shadow memory to
scrutinize attacks and achieve byte precision level. We group
buffers according to their allocation-time calling contexts.
Buffers that share the same allocation-time calling context as
the buffer exploited by the attack are regarded as vulnerable
buffers. The allocation-time calling context of vulnerable
buffers along with other information is collected to generate
patches, i.e., the configuration information. Next, in the online
defense generation phase, the configuration information is
loaded and the stored calling context information guides the
allocator to recognize vulnerable buffers. It properly combines
detailed offline analysis and highly efficient online defenses.
However, if call stack walking (as used by gdb) is used for
obtaining calling contexts, it can incur significant slowdown,
especially for allocation-intensive programs [31]–[33]. We
thus use calling context encoding, which continuously repre-
sents the current calling context in one or a few integers [31].
By reading the integer(s), the encoded calling context, called
Calling Context ID (CCID), can be obtained. By comparing
the CCID for the current buffer allocation with the CCIDs
stored in the configuration information, the online system
can swiftly determine whether the new buffer is vulnerable.
Moreover, we propose targeted calling context encoding,
which is a suite of algorithms that can optimize many famous
calling encoding methods, such as PCC [31], PCCE [32], and
DeltaPath [33]. Since calling context encoding is an important
technique with many applications, the optimization algorithms
constitute a separate contribution.
Installing a heap patch does not change the program code.
Specifically, a heap patch is in the form of a 〈key, value〉
tuple, where the key is the allocation-time CCID of the
vulnerable buffer and the value indicates the vulnerability type
and the parameter(s) for applying the online defense. The
patches are read into a hash table upon program initialization.
It thus takes only O(1) time to determine whether a new buffer
is vulnerable. The online defense is enforced by intercepting
heap buffer allocation and deallocation. Both the hash table
initialization and the buffer allocation/deallocation interception
are transparent to the underlying heap allocator, and imple-
mented in a shared library.2 We thus do not need to change the
underlying heap allocator or depend on a specific allocator.
None of the techniques used in HPAC, except for targeted
calling context encoding, is new. However, static analysis, code
instrumentation, offline attack analysis, and online defense
generation are creatively combined to build a new counter-
measure against heap attacks. A comprehensive evaluation is
performed, showing that HPAC is effective and efficient. We
make the following contributions.
2In Linux, we can load it using LD_PRELOAD.
• We properly combine heavyweight offline attack analysis
and lightweight online defense generation to build a new
heap defense system that simultaneously demonstrates
the following good properties: (1) patch generation with-
out manual efforts, (2) code-less patching, (3) versatile
handling of heap buffer overwrite, overread, use after
free, and uninitialized read, (4) imposing a very small
overhead, and (5) no dependency on specific allocators.
• We propose targeted calling context encoding, a suite of
algorithms that can optimize calling context encoding,
and demonstrate its application to our system.
II. RELATED WORKS
Given the large body of research on heap memory safety, we
do not intend to make an exhaustive list of work on the prob-
lem. Instead, we compare HPAC with other automatic patch
generation techniques, and then examine critical techniques
used in our system.
A. Automatic Patch/Defense Generation
With attack inputs in hand, generating patches/defenses au-
tomatically has been a highly desired goal. We divide previous
researches towards this goal into the following categories.
Bytes pattern based signature generation. Given a large
number of attack inputs, many systems (such as Honey-
comb [34], Autograph [35], and Polygraph [36]) generate sig-
natures by extracting common bytes patterns from the inputs.
However, such methods usually need many attack samples in
order to correctly mine patterns, and cannot work when only
one or very few attack inputs are available. False positives may
be raised when benign inputs happen to match the signatures.
Plus, attackers can mutate the inputs to bypass the detection.
In addition, these systems usually have deployment difficulty
in handling compressed or encrypted inputs.
Semantics based signature generation. Tools like COV-
ERS [37], Hamsa [38], TaintCheck [39] and the work by
Xu et al. [40] propose methods to generate semantics-based
signatures; e.g., spotting the target system call ID used upon
control flow hijacking and filtering out inputs that contain that
ID. They are very effective in handling certain control flow
hijacking attacks, but it is unknown how they can be applied
to addressing overread and uninitialized read. They also have
deployment difficulty in handling compressed and encrypted
attack inputs and may incur false positives.
Tracking faulty instructions. By replaying the attacks, some
systems try to pinpoint faulty instructions that are exploited
by the attacks and try to generate patches to fix them; such
systems include VSEF [41], Vigilant [42], PASAN [43] and
AutoPag [44]. A frequently employed insight is that a tainted
input, e.g., due to overwrite, should not be used to calculate
the indirect jump address. It is unknown how such systems
can handle attacks beyond control flow hijacking, e.g., buffer
overread attacks. Plus, the deployment of the patches requires
code update, just like conventional code patching.
Trial and error for patch generation. Some systems propose
genetic programming based program generation [45], template
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based patch generation [46], and patch generation via machine
learning [47] to generate many patches, and test each of them
against prepared test cases until one patch passes all the tests.
However, it usually takes a lot of effort to prepare well-
structured test cases with a decent test coverage. Other systems
keep generating candidate patches based on certain criteria
until one can recover the program execution [48], [49]. There
is no guarantee a qualified patch can be generated using these
methods. It is also unknown whether the qualified patch may
introduce logic errors.
While there are many works on automatic defense/patch
generation, most of the proposed systems suffer one or more
of the following limitations: deployment difficulties, false
positives, requiring many attack inputs or test cases. Unlike
existing automatic patch generation systems, HPAC supports
eacy deployment without code updates, guarantees zero false
positives, requires only one attack input, and handles multiple
types of heap vulnerabilities.
B. Calling Context Encoding
Background. A calling context is the sequence of active
function calls on the call stack. It carries critical information
about dynamic program behavior. It thus has been widely
used in debugging, testing, anomaly detection, event logging,
performance optimization, and profiling [33]. For example,
logging sensitive system calls is a practice in many systems.
Recording the calling context of the system call provides
important information about the sequence of program com-
ponents that gets involved and leads to the call.
Obtaining calling contexts through stack walking is straight-
forward but very expensive [31]. A few encoding techniques,
which represent a calling context using one or very few inte-
gers, have been proposed to continuously track calling contexts
with a low overhead. The probabilistic calling context (PCC)
technique [31] computes a probabilistically unique integer
ID, essentially a hash value, for each calling context, but
does not support decoding. Precise calling context encoding
(PCCE) [32] stems from path profiling [50] and supports
decoding. Another example is DeltaPath [33], which improves
PCCE by supporting virtual function calls and large-sized pro-
grams. A relevant but different problem is path encoding [50],
which represents program execution paths (within a control
flow graph) into integers.
Similar to targeted calling context encoding, another
work [51] also aims to minimize the overhead due to the
encoding, but uses a very different idea. It performs offline-
profiling runs to establish the mapping s between stack offsets
and calling contexts. It fails if the calling context of interest
does not appear in the profiling runs. Its reported decoding
failure rate is as high as 27%. Finally, it does work if variable-
size local arrays (allowed in C/C++) are used.
C. Calling Context-Sensitive Defenses
Calling context was applied to areas beyond debugging
decades ago. As an example, a region-based heap allocator
tags heap objects with allocation-time calling context [52].
Recently, calling context is used to generate context sensitive
defenses [21], [40], [41], [53], [54]. In particular, Extermi-
nator [53] also proposes to generate context-sensitive heap
patches. However, our system HPAC differs from Extermi-
nator in multiple aspects. (1) Exterminator performs online
probabilistic attack detection (e.g., when an overflow occurs,
it may or may not detect it), while HPAC performs offline
deterministic attack analysis and patch generation. How to
apply patches generated by heavyweight offline analysis to
lightweight online defense generation is not trivial and solved
by our work. (2) Exterminator does not handle overread or
uninitialized-read, while HPAC handles all the frequently ex-
ploited heap vulnerability typs including overwrite, overread,
use after free, and uninitialized read. (3) Exterminator relies
on a custom heap allocator that incurs large overheads, while
HPAC does not; the defense of HPAC is transparent to the
underlying allocator. (4) Exterminator uses the expensive stack
walking to retrieve calling contexts, while targeted calling
context encoding is proposed and applied in HPAC. But the
two works share the insight in calling context-sensitive heap
patches, which we do not claim as our contribution.
D. Shadow Memory
Our offline heavyweight analysis makes use of shadow
memory [55], which tags every byte of memory used by a
program with some information. For example, by tagging a
memory region as inaccessible, a read zone is created. Despite
its powerful capabilities in dynamic analysis, it incurs very
high overheads. The implementation in Memcheck, which is
built in Valgrind, incurs 22.2x slowdown [55]. AddressSani-
tizer significantly improved it, but still incurs 73% with many
functionalities cut [10]. Our system extends shadow memory
by associating every heap buffer with its calling context ID.
HPAC does not propose new techniques (except for targeted
calling context encoding), but properly combines heavyweight
offline analysis (based on shadow memory) and lightweight
online defenses (based on allocation/deallocation interception
and calling context encoding). It overcomes the challenge of
applying offline analysis results to online defenses, and carries
many good properties, such as no dependency on any custom
allocator, and handling of various heap vulnerabilities.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND ARCHITECTURE
A. Problem Statement
Similar to conventional patch generation, our system uses
collected attack inputs for attack investigation and patch gen-
eration. Given a program P that contains a heap vulnerability
V and an attack input I that exploits V , our system outputs
a patch P , which, once installed, can defeat attacks that
exploit V . We consider the three frequently exploited heap
vulnerability types described in Section I.
But our system differs from conventional patch generation
in the following aspects. (1) Instead of relying on manual
investigation, patches can be generated instantly and auto-
matically. (2) Rather than updating the program P to fix
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Fig. 1. System architecture.
heap vulnerabilities, patches only need to be written into a
configuration file C to take effect.
B. System Architecture
As shown in Figure 1, the system consists of the following
components: (1) A Program Instrumentation Tool: it builds
the calling context encoding capability into the program (Sec-
tion IV). Note that the program instrumentation is an one-
time effort. Because of the simplicity of the instrumentation,
its correctness can be verified automatically. The instrumented
program is then used for both offline patch generation and the
online system. (2) An Offline Patch Generator: it automatically
generates the patch by replaying the attack (Section V). (3)
An Online Defense Generator: it is a dynamically linked
library that (a) loads the patches from the configuration
file C at program start, and (b) intercepts buffer allocation
operations for recognizing vulnerable buffers and generate
security measures online (Section VI).
C. Calling-Context Sensitive Patches
Given the attack input that exploits a heap vulnerability V ,
in order to generate a patch P based on attack analysis, it is
critical to extract some invariant among attack instances. Such
invariant then can be used to design protection against future
attacks that also exploit V .
Our observation is that attacks that exploit V usually share
some attack-time calling context (e.g., the sequence of active
function calls that lead to a buffer overflow due to a memcpy
call). If we trace the program execution backward, these
vulnerable buffers probably share the allocation-time calling
context, which we call a vulnerable calling context and can
be used as an invariant to generate the patch P . Whenever a
heap buffer is allocated, the current calling context is retrieved
and compared with vulnerable calling contexts to determine
whether the buffer being allocated is vulnerable.
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Fig. 2. Comparison of different encoding optimization algorithms using an
example call graph. The gray nodes, T1 and T2, are target functions; red
nodes indicate functions whose call sites are instrumented; and white nodes
indicate functions whose call sites are not instrumented. For the simplicity of
presentation, the example does not include back edges. Our algorithms can
handle back edges without problems as shown in Algorithm 1.
IV. TARGETED CALLING CONTEXT ENCODING
Simple call stack walking for retrieving calling contexts
would incur a large overhead, especially for programs with
intensive heap allocations [31]. There exist several efficient
calling context encoding techniques that are famous, such
as [31]–[33]. We propose targeted calling context encoding,
which is a suite of algorithms that can be used to optimize
these encoding techniques. The insight is that when the target
functions, whose calling contexts are of interest, are known,
many irrelevant call sites do not need to be instrumented and
thus the overhead can be significantly reduced.
The input of our algorithms is the call graph of the program,
and the output is a pruned sub-call-graph. As each of the three
famous encoding techniques [31]–[33] can take a graph as
input, they all should work well when the sub-call-graph if fed
to these systems. To make the discussion concrete (and based
on our choice of the encoding technique for heap patching), we
use Probabilistic Calling Context (PCC) [31] to demonstrate
the application of the proposed optimizations.
According to PCC, at the prologue of each function, the
current calling context ID (CCID), which is stored in a thread-
local integer variable V , is read into a local variable t; right
before each call site, V is updated as V = 3 ∗ t + c, where
c is a random constant unique for each call site.3 This way,
V continuously stores the current CCID. Thus, the current
CCID can be obtained conveniently by reading V . With
PCC, however, it may happen that multiple calling contexts
obtain the same encoding due to hash collisions. It is shown
practically and theoretically that the chance of hash collision
is very low [31]. It is worth noting that a hash collision in our
system means that a non-vulnerable buffer is recognized as a
vulnerable buffer and gets enhanced. Any of our enhancements
do not change the program logic, so a hash collision can
cause unnecessary overhead, but it does not affect the
correctness of our system.
3The encoding in PCCE [32] and DeltaPath [33] basically adopts V = t+c,
where c is calculated according to the encoding algorithms.
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We call the original encoding algorithm that take all the
call sites into consideration as Full-Call-Site (FCS) instru-
mentation. The three famous encoding algorithms, PCC [31],
PCCE [32] and DeltaPath [33] all enforce FCS. Figure 2(a)
shows that all the call sites in those red nodes are instrumented,
and T1 and T2 are the target functions. The less call sites are
instrumented, the smaller overhead is expected.
A. Targeted-Call-Site (TCS) Optimization
FCS blindly instruments all the call sites in a program. In
practice, very often users are only interested in the calling
contexts that end at one of a specific set of target functions,
such as security-sensitive system calls and critical transaction
calls. In our case, we are only interested in calling con-
texts when the allocation APIs (such as malloc, calloc,
calloc, memalign, aligned_alloc) are invoked. It is
unnecessary to instrument functions that may never appear in
the call stacks when these target functions are invoked.
We thus propose the first optimization, Targeted-Call-Site
(TCS), where only the call sites that may appear in the calling
contexts of target functions are instrumented. To conduct the
TCS optimization, reachability analysis on the call graph of the
program is performed. Given a call graph G = 〈V,E〉, where
V is the set of nodes representing functions of the program
and E the set of function calls, and a set of functions F , we
perform reachability analysis to find edges that can reach any
of the functions in F , and only call sites corresponding to
these edges are instrumented.
Figure 2(b) shows the instrumentation result of TCS. As the
edges DH and HI cannot reach any of the target functions
T1 and T2, they are pruned from the instrumentation, reducing
the set of call sites that need to be instrumented.
B. Slim Optimization
On the basis of TCS, there is still potential to further prune
the set of call sites to be instrumented. In a call graph, a node
can be classified as either a branching or non-branching one:
a branching node is one that has multiple outgoing edges that
can reach (one of) the target functions. Our insight is that the
purpose of call site instrumentation is to make sure different
calling contexts can obtain different encoding values; given a
non-branching node, whether or how its contained call sites
are instrumented does not affect the distinguishability of the
encoding results. Thus, we propose to avoid instrumenting the
call sites in those non-branching nodes.
For example, as shown in Figure 2(c), according to the Slim
optimization, all call sites in the non-branching nodes, B and
E, are excluded from the instrumentation set.
C. Incremental Optimization
The two optimization algorithms treat all target functions as
a whole. Our another insight is that when the call to a target
function is intercepted for analysis or logging purpose, the
analyzer or logger usually knows the target function. In our
case, when malloc and memalign are intercepted, different
interception functions will be invoked.
Therefore, we can use the pair of 〈 Target_fun, CCID
〉 (rather than CCID alone) to distinguish different calling
contexts. Based on this insight, we propose another opti-
mization algorithm that can further reduce the number of
instrumented call sites. A node is an true branching node if
it has two or more outgoing edges that reach the same target
function. That is, if a node has multiple outgoing edges, each
of which reaches a different target function, it is called a false
branching node. The idea of the Incremental encoding is to
avoid instrumentation the call sites in a false branching node.
In Figure 2, node A is a true branching node, as its two
outgoing edges can reach the same node T1 (and T2 as well).
So is node C, as its two outgoing edges can reach T1. Thus,
only the call sites that correspond to AB, AC, CE, CF need
to be instrumented. Take the calling contexts of T2 as an
example, the instrumentation at AB and AC is sufficient to
distinguish the two calling contexts that reach T2.
Algorithm 1 Incremental Optimization.
Input: A call graph CG = 〈N,E〉, and the set of target functions
T ⊆ N .
Output: The functions in N to be instrumented.
1: function FILTER(T,CG = 〈N,E〉):
2: InstrumentationSet← {}
3: for t ∈ T do
4: V isitedNodes← {}
5: Queue.push(t)
6: for n← Queue.pop() do
7: V isitedNodes.push(n)
8: for each e = 〈m,n〉 of the incoming edges of n do
9: if m /∈ V isitedNodes then
10: Queue.push(m)
11: for n ∈ V isitedNodes do
12: count← 0
13: for each e = 〈n,m〉 of outgoing edges of n do
14: if m ∈ V isitedNodes then
15: count← count+ 1
16: if count > 1 then
17: InstrumentationSet.push(n)
18: return InstrumentationSet
Algorithm 1 shows the algorithm for incremental optimiza-
tion. Line 3 illustrates the idea of processing each target
function incrementally. For each target function, Lines 4–17
are to find true branching nodes relative to it. Specifically,
Lines 4–10 are a backward breadth-first search; as it omits
nodes already visited (Line 9), it can correctly handle back
edges. Then Lines 11–17 are to find true branching nodes.
In short, the three encoding optimization algorithms are
based on different insights and ideas, and each improves on
the previous one in terms of reducing the set of call sites to
be instrumented.
V. OFFLINE ATTACK ANALYSIS AND PATCH GENERATION
The Offline Patch Generator component runs the vulnerable
program using the attack input and generates the patch as
part of the dynamic analysis report. It is built on dynamic
binary instrumentation and shadow memory of Valgrind [55].
As shown in Figure 3, for every bit of the program memory,
5
Byte1 Byte2 ………….. Byten
Application 
Memory Byte2
Shadow 
Information
Shadow 
Information …………..
Shadow 
Information
Shadow 
Memory
Shadow 
Information
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A bit
 V bits
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A bit
 V bits
Fig. 3. Shadow memory.
1 typedef struct {
uint32_t i;
uint8_t c;
} A;
5 A y, *p = (A *) malloc( sizeof(A) );
p->i = 0; p->c = ’f’;
y = *p;
Fig. 4. Legal uninitialized read due to padding.
a Validity bit (V-bit) is maintained to indicate whether the
accompanying bit has a legitimate value; instructions are
inserted for the propagation of V-bits when data copy occurs
(e.g., when a word is read from memory to a register); for
every byte of the memory location, an Accessibility bit (A-
bit) is maintained to indicate whether the memory location
can be accessed.
When a heap buffer is malloc-ed, the returned memory is
marked as accessible but invalid. Each buffer is surrounded
by a pair of red zones (16 bytes each), which are marked
as inaccessible. When a heap buffer is free-ed, its memory
is set as inaccessible. In addition, whenever a heap buffer is
allocated, the current calling context ID (CCID) is recorded
and associated with the buffer.
(1) Detecting overflows: A buffer overflow will access the
inaccessible red zone appended to the buffer and get detected.
(2) Detecting use after free: A free-ed buffer is set as
inaccessible and then added to a FIFO queue of freed blocks.
Thus, the memory is not immediately made available for reuse.
Any attempts to access any of the blocks in the queue can be
detected. The maximum total size of the buffers in the queue is
set as 2GB by default, which is large enough for the exploits
we investigated, and can be customized. In Section IX, we
discuss how to handle it if the quota is insufficient.
(3) Detecting uninitialized read: To detect uninitialized read,
an attempt is to report any access to uninitialized data, but this
will lead to many false positives. For instance, given the code
snippet in Figure 4, most of the compilers will round the size
of A to 8 bytes; so only 5 bytes of the heap buffer is initialized
(and the V-bits for the remaining 3 bytes are zero), while the
compiler typically generates code to copy all 8 bytes for y =
*p, which would cause false positives due to accessing the 3
bytes whose V-bits are zero.
To avoid false positives due to padding, we check the V-
bit of a value only when it is used to decide the control flow
 <API,           CCID,  Vulnerability>
 <memalign, 1854955292,  OVERFLOW>
 <calloc,        8643565443,  USE-AFTER-FREE>
 <malloc,       2598251483,  UNINITIALIZED-READ>
 … ...
Read by Online 
Defense Generator
Key Value
 <MEMALIGN, 1854955292>
 <CALLOC, 8643565443>
 <MALLOC, 2598251483>
…..
(001)2
(010)2
(100)2
… … 
Configuration file
Hash table
Fig. 5. Patches read into a hash table.
(e.g., jnz), used as a memory address, or used in a system
call (as the kernel behavior is not tracked). As every bit of the
program has a V-bit, bit-precision detection of uninitialized
read is achieved. Moreover, origin tracking is used to track
the use of invalid data back to the uninitialized data (such
as a heap buffer) when a warning is raised, which allows
us to retrieve the allocation-time CCID associated with the
vulnerable buffer. When an attack is detected, the patch is
generated in the form of 〈 FUN, CCID, T〉, where FUN is
the function used to request the heap buffer (such as malloc,
memalign), CCID is an integer representing the allocation-
time calling context ID of the vulnerable buffer, and T is a
three-bit integer representing the vulnerability type (the three
bits are used to indicate OVERFLOW, USE-AFTER-FREE,
UNINITIALIZED-READ, respectively). Example patches are
shown in the upper graph in Figure 5.
How to handle realloc: If the new size is smaller than the
original size, the cut-off region is marked as inaccessible. If
the new size is larger, the added region is set as accessible but
invalid. The allocation-time CCID associated with the buffer
is also updated with the value upon the realloc invocation.
How to handle multiple vulnerabilities: An attack input may
exploit multiple vulnerabilities. For example, the Heartbleed
attack exploits both uninitialized read and overread. In order to
handle the case that an attack exploits multiple vulnerabilities,
we resume the program execution upon warnings. Plus, once
the V bits for a value have been checked, they are then set to
valid; this avoids a large number of chained warnings. Finally,
a script is used to process the many warnings according to
the origin (i.e., the address of the vulnerable buffer) of those
warnings and generate patches correctly.
VI. CODE-LESS PATCHING AND ONLINE DEFENSES
When the patched program is started, as shown in Figure 5,
the Online Defense Generator library has an initialization
function4 that reads patches from the configuration file and
stores them into a hash table, where the key of each entry
is 〈 ALLOCATION_FUNCTION, CCID〉 and the value is the
vulnerability type(s) and parameters, if any, for applying the
security measures. Note once the hash table is initialized,
its memory pages are set as read only.
4__attribute__((constructor)) is used to declare the function.
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Padding 
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User buffer 
User buffer 
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size
Unused
48 bits
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Fig. 6. Buffer structures. Note how we pack the metadata into only one word
(64 bits) preceding the user buffer.
The Online Defense Generator library intercepts all heap
memory allocation operations. Whenever a heap buffer is
allocated, the name of the allocation function (hardcoded into
the interposing function) along with the current CCID is used
to search in the patch hash table, which takes only O(1) time.
If there is no match, the buffer does not need to be enhanced;
otherwise, the buffer is enhanced based on the associated
vulnerability type(s) and parameters.
While the security measures themselves are straightforward,
several considerations make the design challenging. (1) In
some cases, the same buffer may be vulnerable to multiple
attacks, such as uninitialized read and overflow. (2) In addition
to handling malloc and free, the system needs to support
a family of other allocation functions, such as realloc and
memalign (aligned allocation). These challenges are well
resolved by our system.
One complexity is that we maintain heap metadata our-
selves, such as the buffer size (to support realloc correctly),
vulnerability type(s), the buffer alignment information, and the
location of the guard page, so that our system can work
without having to change the underlying allocator or rely
on its internals.
(1) Handling overflows: If the buffer is vulnerable to over-
flows, a guard page is appended to it to prevent such attacks.
While the guard page can effectively prevent overflows, they
are known to be prohibitively expensive when being applied
to every buffer. In our system, however, the guard page
is precisely applied to vulnerable buffers, and the resulting
overhead is dramatically reduced.
As shown in Figure 6, Structure 2 is used for non-aligned
buffers, while Structure 4 is used for aligned buffers (allocated
using memalign, etc.). When a heap allocation request is
intercepted, the requested size is increased to accommodate the
word for metadata and the guard page (as well as necessary
padding following the user buffer to ensure the guard page is
page aligned). The address of the user buffer is returned to
service the user program.
The metadata word contains rich information and is worth
detailed interpretation. (1) In all structures, the least significant
four bits is called the buffer type field, where three bits
represent the vulnerability type (one bit is used to indicate
each of the three vulnerability types, i.e., Overflow, Use
after Free, and Uninitialized Read) and one bit
indicates whether the buffer is aligned. (2) 36 bits are used
to indicate the location of the guard page. Currently, 64-bit
operations systems only use a 48-bit virtual address space;
plus, a guard page is 4KB=212B aligned. Thus, 48− 12 = 36
bits are sufficient. A guard page is set as inaccessible using
mprotect. The user buffer size information is stored as the
first word of the guard page, and it is needed for supporting
realloc. (3) If the buffer is aligned (Structure 3 and
Structure 4), there is a padding field whose size depends on
the alignment size. The alignment size information is needed
to determine the buffer address given the address of the User
Buffer upon a free call. As the alignment size is always
a power of two (i.e., 2n), we only need 6 bits to store the
value of n ∈ [0, 64], which then can be used to calculate the
alignment size.
(2) Handling use after free: If an allocation is not aligned, the
buffer takes Structure 1; otherwise, Structure 3. The metadata
word uses 48 bits to store the user buffer size. When a buffer
vulnerable to use after free is to be free-ed, it is put into
an FIFO queue of freed blocks to defer the reuse. In our
system, only buffers vulnerable to use-after-free are put into
the queue, such that given the same quota the time a freed
buffer stays in the queue is much lengthened, which hence
significantly increases the difficulty of exploitation of a use-
after-free vulnerability for it increases the uncertainty entropy
a freed buffer is reused by attackers.
(3) Handling uninitialized read: Similar to the above, if
the allocation is not aligned, the buffer takes Structure 1;
otherwise, Structure 3. The user buffer region is initialized
with zeros before it is returned to the user program.
Table I summarizes how different buffer structures are
used for handling different cases, including when multiple
vulnerabilities affect the same buffer. If there is a threat of
overflow, Structure 2 or Structure 4 is used to accommodate
the guard page depending on whether the allocation call is
memalign. Whenever there is use after free, upon being freed
the buffer is put into the freed-blocks queue to defer the reuse
of these buffers.
How the Online System Handles free() calls: A particular
advantage of our system is that it supports the deployment of
heap patches without modifying the underlying allocator. It
works solely by intercepting the memory allocation calls. On
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TABLE I
A SUMMARY OF THE USE OF BUFFER STRUCTURES.
Vulnerability type Not aligned Aligned
Not Vulnerable Structure 1 Structure 3
Overflow Structure 2 Structure 4
Use-after-free Structure 1 Structure 3
Uninitialized read Structure 1 Structure 3
Overflow &
Use-after-free Structure 2 Structure 4
Overflow &
Uninitialized read Structure 2 Structure 4
Use-after-free &
Uninitialized read Structure 1 Structure 3
Overflow &
Use-after-free &
Uninitialized read
Structure 2 Structure 4
free call
Align bit is set?
Get alignment
information
Get original 
buffer address
Invoke original free
End
Push the buffer into 
the queue of freed 
blocks
Overflow bit is set?
Turn the guard page 
into a normal page
Yes
Yes
No
No
Use-after-free
bit is set?
No
Yes
Fig. 7. Handling free().
the other, it complicates the handling of freeing buffers.
As shown in Figure 7, when free(p) is invoked by the
user program, the Online Defense Generator intercepts the
call and handles it as follows. (1) If the Overflow bit in the
metadata word is set, the location information of the guard
page is retrieved and the guard page is set as accessible
using mprotect. (2) Based on the user buffer address p,
the initial address of the buffer pi is calculated. Specifically,
if the buffer was not allocated using memalign, pi =
p - sizeof(void*); otherwise, the alignment size A is
retrieved and pi = p - A. (3) If the Use-after-Free bit is
set, the block is put into the queue of the freed blocked;
otherwise, the buffer is released using the original free API
of the underlying allocator and the buffer address pi is passed
to the call.
VII. OTHER IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
Implementation of the Program Instrumentation Tool.
Currently, we add a pass into LLVM, which performs the
call graph analysis to determine the set of call sites to be
instrumented and then instruments them. This implementation
assumes the program source code is available. Another viable
implementation path is based on binary code instrumentation,
e.g., via Dyninst, which can insert code into the program
dynamically.5 It is worth mentioning that Dyninst does not
require the source code to perform instrumentation. Thus, soft-
ware users (not only software companies) can also instrument
their software (only once) and generate patches themselves.
Implementation of the Offline Patch Generator. This com-
ponent is built on the basis of Valgrind [55]. We reuse its
shadow memory functionality and modify the tool to support
the needed handling of allocation and deallocation. Significant
effort has been saved by making use of Valgrind, which
in the meanwhile is a mature dynamic analysis tool. The
implementation over Valgrind also benefits us to analyze
various complex real-world programs successfully.
Implementation of the Online Defense Generator. It is
implemented as a shared library, which reads the patches
in the configuration file to the hash table and interposes all
the allocation function calls to enhance vulnerable buffers
according to the patches. The hash table memory pages are
set as read-only once the initialization is done. The library
is loaded using LD_PRELOAD in our prototype. It does not
change the underlying heap allocator or rely on its internals.
VIII. EVALUATION
We have evaluated HPAC in terms of both effectiveness
and efficiency. We not only evaluate it on the SPEC CPU2006
benchmarks and many vulnerable programs, but also run
the system with real-world service programs. The efficiency
improvement of the calling context encoding optimization
algorithms is also measured. Our experiments use a machine
with a 2.8GHZ CPU, 16G RAM running 16.04 Ubuntu and
Linux Kernel 4.10.
A. Effectiveness
To evaluate the effectiveness of our system HPAC, we
run it on a series of programs, as shown in Table II, which
contain a variety of heap vulnerabilities. In the effectiveness
experiments, we aim to evaluate (1) whether the Offline
Patch Generator can correctly determine the vulnerability type
and generate patches; and (2) whether the generated patches
can effectively prevent attacks from exploiting those heap
5So far, our Dyninst-based solution only supports single threaded programs.
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TABLE II
VULNERABLE PROGRAMS USED IN THE EVALUATION. UR AND RAF STAND
FOR UNINITIALIZED READ AND USE AFTER FREE, RESPECTIVELY.
Program Vulnerability Reference
Heartbleed UR & Overflow CVE-2014-0160
bc-1.06 Overflow Bugbench [56]
GhostXPS 9.21 UR CVE-2017-9740
optipng-0.6.4 UaF CVE-2015-7801
tiff-4.0.8 Overflow CVE-2017-9935
wavpack-5.1.0 UaF CVE-2018-7253
libming-0.4.8 Overflow CVE-2018-7877
SAMATE Dataset Variety 23 heap bugs [57]
vulnerabilities. It is worth mentioning that HPAC, as a single
system, can handle the variety of heap vulnerabilities; plus,
different from conventional code patches, installing patches
do not modify any line of the program code and hence do not
introduce stability or logic errors (but we do require one-time
program instrumentation). Below we describe details for some
of the experiments we performed.
Heartbleed Attacks. Heartbleed was a notorious vulnerability
of OpenSSL and affected a large number of services [58].
By sending an ill formed heartbeat request and receiving
the response, the attacker can steal data from the vulnerable
services, such as private keys and user account information.
While Heartbleed is widely known as a heap buffer over-read
vulnerability, actually the attacker can exploit two different
vulnerabilities: over-read and uninitialized read. Specifically,
the vulnerable heap buffer has 34KB, while the size l of the
data stealing from the buffer can be up to 64KB. If l < 34K,
the attack is just an uninitialized read that leaks data previously
stored in the buffer; otherwise, it is a mix of uninitialized read
and over-read [59].
A service was created using the OpenSSL utility
s_server.6 We then collected different attack inputs from
Internet, and used one of them to generate the patch. Our
Offline Patch Generator correctly identified it as a mix of
uninitialized read and overflow and output the patch. The patch
was then automatically written into the configuration file of
the Online Defense Generator, which was able to precisely
recognize and enhance the vulnerable buffers. We then tried
different attack inputs, and no data was leaked except for the
zeros filled in the buffers.
bc-1.06. bc, for basic calculator, is an arbitrary-precision
calculator language with syntax similar to the C programming
language. Some versions of its implementation contain a heap
buffer overflow vulnerability. We obtained a buggy version
of this program from BugBench, a C/C++ bug benchmark
suite [56], and collected a malicious input that overflows
buffers and corrupts the adjacent data. By feeding the input
into our Offline Patch Generator that ran the buggy program,
an overflow patch was generated. With the patch deployed,
our system successfully stopped the attack before it corrupted
6In order to support the interposition of the allocation operations, we
compiled OpenSSL using OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELIST compilation flag
to disable the use of freelists.
any data.
GhostXPS 9.21. GhostXPS is an implementation of the Mi-
crosoft XPS document format built on top of Ghostscript,
which is an interpreter/renderer for PostScript and normalizing
PDF files. It is the leading independent interpreter software
with the most comprehensive set of page description languages
on the market today. Some versions of GhostXPS contain an
uninitialized read vulnerability that can be exploited using a
crafted document. We collected a buggy version of GhostXPS
from their git repository and the malicious document input.
In the offline patch generation phase, the uninitialized read
attack was detected and a patch was generated. During the
online heap protection phase, the attack was not able to steal
any data, except for zeros, from memory.
optipng-0.6.4. OptiPNG is a PNG image optimizer that
compresses image files to a smaller size without losing any
information. Specific versions of this optimizer allow the
attacker to exploit a use-after-free vulnerability and execute
arbitrary code via crafted PNG files. We collected a vulnerable
version (optipng-0.6.4) and a malicious PNG image.
The Offline Patch Generator correctly identified the attack
and generated a patch. The Online Defense Generator made
use of the patch to recognize the vulnerable buffers and
defeated the use-after-free attacks by deferring the deallocation
of vulnerable buffers.
tiff-4.0.8. TIFF provides support for ”Tag Image File
Format”, commonly used for sorting image data. In
LibTIFF 4.0.8, there is a heap buffer overflow in the
t2p_write_pdf function in tools/tiff-2pdf.c. We
were able to generate the patch, which could successfully
prevent the overflow.
SAMATE Dataset. We evaluated our system on the SAMATE
Dataset, which is maintained by NIST [57] and contains 23
programs with heap buffer overflow, uninitialized read, or use
after free vulnerabilities. Our system successfully generated
patches for all of them and prevented the vulnerabilities from
being exploited.
B. Efficiency
We compared the overhead incurred by the different calling
context encoding algorithms, and measured the overall speed
overhead and memory overhead incurred by our system.
We used our LLVM-based implementation to measure the
efficiency of different calling context encoding algorithms.
1) Overhead Comparison of Different Calling Context En-
coding Algorithms: To measure the execution time overhead
imposed by different calling context encoding algorithms,
we applied them to the programs in the SPEC CPU2006
Integer benchmarks, and measured the execution time when
different encoding techniques were applied, normalized using
the execution time when no encoding is applied. Compared
to FCS (Full Call-Site Instrumentation) proposed in [31],
which incurred 2.4% of slowdown for C/C++ programs, the
other three encoding algorithms proposed by us, that is, TCS
(Targeted Call-Site Instrumentation), Slim, and Incremental,
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TABLE III
SPEC CPU2006 BENCHMARK PROGRAM SIZE INCREASE, IN
PERCENTAGE, DUE TO DIFFERENT ENCODING ALGORITHMS.
Benachmark FCS(%) TCS(%) Slim(%) Incremental(%)
400.perlbench 19.6 16.2 15.9 15.9
401.bzip2 8.8 0.12 0.12 0.12
403.gcc 18.6 14.7 13.6 13.6
429.mcf 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53
445.gobmk 4.8 3.2 2.5 2.5
456.hmmer 18.9 5.9 2.4 1.2
458.sjeng 10.6 0.08 0.08 0.08
462.libquantum 15 7.7 7.7 7.7
464.h264ref 8.3 3.6 1.8 1.8
471.omnetpp 15.8 7.2 6.7 6.7
473.astar 7.0 7.0 0.2 0.2
483.xalancbmk 14.5 4.1 3.8 3.8
incurred 0.6%, 0.5%, and 0.4% of slowdown, receptively.
While the saved execution time itself is small, it gains up to
6x of speed up. We believe the proposed encoding algorithms
can have many applications far beyond memory protection;
plus, when they are applied to Java programs, where FCS may
incur more than 35% of overhead [33], the speed up due to
our algorithms could make a significant difference.
As the encoding works by inserting instructions into the
programs, we also measured the program size increase. The
results are shown in Table III. While FCS increased the
binary size by an average of 12% when compared to the
uninstrumented binaries, TCS, Slim and Incremental incurred
only 6%, 4.5%, and 4.4% of size increase, respectively.
2) Efficiency of HPAC: To evaluate the run-time overhead
of our system, we ran our system on both SPEC CPU2006
Integer benchmarks and a set of real-world service programs.
SPEC CPU2006. The speed overhead incurred by HPAC can
be divided into four parts: (1) overhead due to instrumenta-
tion, which has been presented above; (2) overhead due to
interposition of heap memory allocation calls; (3) overhead
due to maintaining the meta data of each buffer (such that our
system does not rely on the internal details of the underlying
allocator); (4) overhead due to patch deployment, which causes
the security measures to be applied to vulnerable buffers .
In order to measure the overhead incurred due to patch
deployment, we select a set of allocation-time CCIDs (Calling-
Context IDs) as hypothesized vulnerable ones as follows. First,
for each benchmark program, we rank all of its allocation-
time CCIDs according to their frequencies during the profiling
execution (that is, how many heap buffers have been allo-
cated under that calling context). Next, we pick the CCIDs
with median frequencies as the hypothesized vulnerable ones.
Finally, we regard the heap buffers with those allocation-
time CCIDs as ones vulnerable to overflows (the other two
vulnerability types are much less expensive to treat), and
generate corresponding patches for them.
Figure 8 shows the measurement results. The overhead due
to interposition is 1.9%, and the overhead for maintaining the
TABLE IV
SPEC CPU2006 BENCHMARK HEAP ALLOCATION STATISTICS.
Benachmark malloc calloc realloc
400.perlbench 346,405,116 0 11,736,402
401.bzip2 174 0 0
403.gcc 23,690,559 4,723,237 44,688
429.mcf 5 3 0
445.gobmk 606,463 0 52,115
456.hmmer 1,983,014 122,564 368,696
458.sjeng 5 0 0
462.libquantum 1 121 58
464.h264ref 7,270 170,518 0
471.omnetpp 267,064,936 0 0
473.astar 4,799,959 0 0
483.xalancbmk 135,155,553 0 0
meta data for buffers (plus the interposition overhead) is 4.3%.
Note that this part of overhead can be easily eliminated if our
system is integrated with the underlying heap allocator. When
one patch is installed, the overhead becomes 4.7%, only 0.4%
of overhead increase. The total overhead is 5.2% when five
patches are installed. One outlier is 400.perlbench, which
has the most intensive heap allocations. Table IV records the
heap allocation statistics for each SPEC CPU2006 benchmark.
We also measured the memory consumption of benchmark
programs with and without our system deployed. To perform
the experiments we used a script that can compute the memory
overhead in terms of the average Resident Set Size (RSS)
for the benchmark programs. That script reads the VmRSS
field of /proc/[pid]/status. The sampling rate of that
script is 30 times per second; then, the mean of the reading is
calculated. Figure 9 shows the memory consumption overhead
normalized over native program execution, and the average
memory overhead is only 4.3%.
Service Programs. We also evaluated our system on two
popular service programs: Nginx and MySQL. We used
Nginx 1.2, and measured the throughput overhead by sending
requests using Apache Benchmark. Different numbers of
concurrent requests were used, and the throughput was com-
pared with that of native execution. The average throughput
overhead is only 4.25%.
MySQL 5.5.9 was used, and we applied the built-in test
script to measuring the throughput overhead. There was no
observable throughput overhead. The memory overhead in
both cases was negligible. Note that the memory overhead
is proportional with the number of live heap buffers.
Summary. The evaluation shows that HPAC is not only effec-
tive but also very efficient. Its most optimized calling context
encoding incurs only 0.4% of slowdown, a 6 times of speed
boost compared to the original encoding algorithm. The 4.3%
speed slowdown, due to allocation/deallocation interposition
and metadata maintaining, can be largely eliminated if our sys-
tem is integrated with the underlying heap allocator. Installing
a single hypothesized heap patch only incurs another 0.4% of
speed slowdown. It is noticeable the throughput overhead on
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real-world service programs is very low or negligible.
Unlike many heap protection systems that typically incur
a very high overhead (e.g., 2.5X of slowdown using Mem-
orySanitizer [22] that detects deterministic uninitialized read
detection only and 20% of slowdown using Dieharder [15] that
provides probabilistic protection) and/or handles only one heap
vulnerability type (e.g., HeapTherapy [21]), HPAC handles
multiple frequently exploited heap vulnerability types with
high efficiency. The patch generation is precise and automatic,
and the patch deployment does not require manual intervention
and does not modify the program code, guaranteeing that no
new bugs are generated.
IX. DISCUSSION AMD FUTURE WORK
A limitation is that HPAC can only handle buffer overflows
due to continual write or read operations, which are the main
form of buffer overflows. Overflows due to discrete read
or write cannot be handled by HPAC. Plus, if an overflow
runs over an array which is an internal field of a buffer,
HPAC cannot detect it. The limitation is common in many
existing countermeasures against buffer overflows, such as
AddressSanitizer [10] and Exterminator [53].
It may happen that a heap vulnerability can be exploited
with multiple CCIDs, and thus the attacker may develop
different attack input to exploit buffers with new allocation
calling contexts. However, whenever the attack exploits a
buffer allocated in a new calling context, our system simply
treats it as a new vulnerability and starts another defense
cycle. More importantly, based on our evaluation and previous
researches on context-sensitive defenses [21], [40], [48], [53],
this is rare.
We do not claim that HPAC is to replace existing patching
system. It is to complement conventional patching by provid-
ing immediate and bug-free protection when the fresh patches
are still not mature and may need more time for testing.
For programs that have a large memory profile, to analyze
the use-after-free attack, the memory quota for the FIFO
queue of freed blocks may be exceeded. In this case, we can
replay attacks in multiple executions; specifically, we divide
the whole space of CCIDs into N subspaces, and each of the
N executions defers the deallocation of buffers that have the
allocation-time CCIDs in one of the subspaces. Now, each
execution is expected to consume 1/N of the memory.
Some works aim to discover more zero-day heap vulnerabil-
ities before software release [7]–[9], while other works try to
pinpoint memory defects by analyzing the core dumps [60],
[61]. How to combine them with our system for proactive
patch generation and patch generation without attack replay is
an interesting problem; we will explore it as our future work.
X. CONCLUSIONS
We have combined heavyweight offline attack analysis,
lightweight online defense generation, and program instrumen-
tation to build a new heap memory defense system HPAC.
It has overcome the challenge of generating online defenses
for handling a variety of vulnerabilities, and even combo
vulnerabilities (a buffer that can be exploited by different
types of attacks). The task is further complicated when buffer
metadata maintainence is transparent to the underlying heap
allocators, and does not assume any special custom allocators.
The new heap defense system has many prominent advan-
tages: (1) patch generation without manual efforts, (2) code-
less patching, (3) versatile handling of heap buffer overwrite,
overread, use after free, and uninitialized read, (4) imposing
a very small overhead, and (5) no dependency on specific
allocators. In addition, we have proposed targeted calling con-
text encoding, which should interest researchers applying or
building calling context encoding techniques. The evaluation
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shows that the system as well as the encoding optimization is
effective and efficient. The speed overhead is only 5.2% when
five patches are installed on SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks.
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